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16 SEP 1985

DIA REGISTRY  
FILE: 18-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Executive Director  
Deputy Director for Administration

25X1 FROM: [redacted]  
Director of Training and Education

SUBJECT: Soviet Affairs Training Program

REFERENCE: Memo for DDA, DDI, DDO, DDS&T, D/OTE fm DCI,  
dtd 7 August 85, same subject

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25X1 1. I have explored your request for recommendations regarding a  
Soviet Affairs Training Program with a working group consisting of and  
representatives of the DO [redacted] DI (Doug MacEachin), and DS&T [redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] and the NIO/USSR.

2. The working group strongly agrees that the Agency generally--and  
especially the junior and mid-level officers working directly on the  
USSR--would benefit greatly from a first-rate Soviet Affairs Training  
Program. The program would consist of:

- four to five one- to two-week courses;
- 10 - 15 specialized modules;
- luncheon/evening seminars;
- video/self-study.

3. Objectives

The working group agreed that the principal objectives of the  
program are to:

--bring up to speed quickly officers who work on the USSR but  
whose academic or professional background on the Soviet Union is  
limited;

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—strengthen the understanding of Soviet specialists in areas not of their specialty, with emphasis on Soviet active measures, deception, and intelligence operations;

—strengthen the understanding of the totality of the Soviet Union as a political problem for the U.S. and as the first priority intelligence issue for CIA;

—challenge and enrich the perspectives of Soviet specialists;

—build a stronger sense of community among Soviet analysts and collectors;

—strengthen the understanding of the USSR on the part of non-Soviet analysts and collectors.

#### 4. Operating Bias

The working group agreed that the content and methods of delivery must meet schedules of busy officers, many of whom are overseas. This means:

—courses should be as short as possible;

—stand-alone modules;

—tape and video-disc presentations, especially for overseas use;

—direct overseas offering;

—self-study.

In addition:

—emphasis on "real world" Soviet behavior and on current and near term (1 - 3 years) Soviet intelligence issues;

—maximize exposure to different perspectives on USSR;

—maximize challenge to conventional thinking on USSR.

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5. Target Audience

The program would be directed to the needs of junior and mid-level officers working primarily on the USSR. The Agency has some

issues, including:

Additional numbers would come from the ranks of non-Soviet specialists who have a need for some general or specialized understanding of Soviet policies or operations.

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6. Courses

An overview course of about 40 hours would be designed to warrant that participants are exposed to an introductory understanding of the full range of issues. The course would go beyond substance and address the issues of the limits to our knowledge, that is,

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7. Modules

A major part of the Soviet training program would consist of about 10 - 15 specialized modules. Among the topics under consideration are:

- The Soviet Union as an Intelligence Target
- Soviet Active Measures
- Soviet Measures for Deception
- Soviets and Arms Control
- Soviet Economics
- Kremlin Politics

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SUBJECT: Soviet Affairs Training Program

- Soviet Military Strategy and Doctrine
- Soviets in the Third World
- Scientific and Technical Trends
- Security and Intelligence Operations

8. Seminars

A coordinated series of luncheon and evening seminars would be designed to complement the program by exposing Agency officers to the full range of competing interpretations on key aspects of the modular courses. In addition to academics and members of research institutions, the guest speakers would include policy officials, Congress members, businessmen, defectors, and emigres.

9. Program Director and Staff

The working group is unanimous in its recommendation that a DO officer, either current or retired, direct all aspects of the proposed Soviet Affairs Study Program. We have a list of retired SE officers and have already been in touch with a couple of excellent candidates (see Attachment A). (Incidentally, there is very strong support for this effort on the part of every Soviet specialist we have talked to.)

10. We have developed a list of Soviet hands in CIA who would be willing to help with incidental parts of the program (see Attachment B). A similar list of outside experts is being developed (see Attachment C).

11. Issues

The working group believes strongly that some elements of the program should be required of all Soviet specialists. For example, you could mandate that all Soviet specialists must take at least two modules per year or that all new Soviet specialists take the overview course within two years of their assignment. The details can be worked out, but we need your views on the question of what, if anything, is "required."

--Yes, some elements should be required \_\_\_\_\_

--No, we do not need to make any aspect required \_\_\_\_\_

--Let the individual Directorates decide \_\_\_\_\_

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SUBJECT: Soviet Affairs Training Program

12. We request your approval to proceed with the development of the program. If you concur on the general approach, we will be back to you in 45 days with an action plan for implementing the first phase.

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


Attachments

cc: NIO/USSR  
D/SOVA  
C/SE  
C/CDS/DS&T

CONCUR:

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


Deputy Director for Administration

9/17/85

Date


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


Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

23 SEP 1985

Date

APPROVED:



Director of Central Intelligence

25 SEP 1985

Date

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**ATTACHMENT A**

**Soviet Affairs Training Program--List of Potential Agency Instructors**

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Overview of SE Operations

The Soviet Target Abroad

Active Measures; Deception; Disinformation

Soviet Intelligence Services

The Soviet Mentality; Political; Economic

Soviet Military; S&T

Soviet Military

Political and Economic

Political, Economic, and Military

Theater Forces

Politico-economic policy and internal politics

Politico-economic policy and internal politics

Soviet economics

Soviet economics

Soviet economics

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
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ATTACHMENT C

LIST OF POTENTIAL PROGRAM DIRECTORS

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